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Contractual	Arbitrage	
	
Stephen	J.	Choi,	Mitu	Gulati	&	Robert	E.	Scott*	
	
I. Introduction	
Contracts	are	inevitably	incomplete.	No	matter	how	diligently	parties	try	to	anticipate	all	
the	possible	contingencies	that	may	affect	their	performance,	they	will	fail	simply	because	the	
transactions	costs	of	writing	complete	contracts	are	too	onerous.	There	are	many	contingencies	
that	are	difficult	to	discuss	ex	ante	(such	as	what	happens	when	the	relationship	breaks	up),	
and	others	where	the	probability	of	an	event	is	too	small	to	justify	the	parties	negotiating	over	
it	in	the	drafting	process.		Add	to	the	foregoing	the	fact	that	parties	will	have	incomplete	
information	regarding	each	other’s	character	and	actions	under	the	contract,	and	the	fact	that	
the	contracts	are	drafted	by	agents	whose	actions	cannot	be	monitored	fully	by	their	principals,	
and	we	have	a	host	of	reasons	for	why	gaps	and	linguistic	uncertainties	are	ubiquitous	in	
commercial	contracts.	
	
Linguistic	uncertainty—terms	with	indeterminate	meaning—present	opportunities	for	
strategic	behavior	well	after	a	contract	has	been	concluded:	there	is	always	the	risk	that,	at	
some	point	in	the	relationship,	one	of	the	parties	will	have	an	incentive	to	argue	that	the	
parties	intended	the	uncertain	term	or	phrase	to	be	interpreted	in	its	favor.	From	a	societal	
point	of	view,	this	problem	is	diminished	in	importance	so	long	as	the	risk	of	parties	exploiting	
contractual	uncertainties	is	priced	into	the	contract	at	the	outset.	Further,	sophisticated	
parties,	having	observed	how	an	equivocal	contractual	term	was	exploited,	should	be	able	to	
revise	the	contract	terms	in	subsequent	transactions	by	substituting	a	new	provision	that	
eliminates	the	patent	ambiguity.			Put	differently,	the	opportunities	for	contractual	arbitrage,	
where	one	party	to	a	contract	opportunistically	exploits	a	linguistic	uncertainty	by	advancing	an	
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interpretation	not	contemplated	by	the	parties	in	the	ex	ante	drafting	process,	are	eliminated	
quickly	in	markets	with	sophisticated	players.		At	least,	that’s	the	theory.	
	
Boilerplate	or	standard-form	contracts,	however,	are	very	different	from	the	paradigmatic	
bespoke	commercial	contract.		They	are	standard-form;	thus,	by	definition,	these	instruments	
fit	individual	deals	less	than	perfectly	than	their	situation-specific	tailored	cousins.	In	other	
words,	the	contractual	indeterminacy	is	going	to	be	greater	(or	at	least	more	numerous)	than	
with	a	tailored	contract	because	the	fit	with	any	individual	transactions	is	necessarily	imperfect.	
Further,	because	one	of	the	primary	virtues	of	standard-form	contracts	is	the	production	of	
network	externalities,	boilerplate	contracts	can	be	slow	to	change,	even	when	costly	
ambiguities	are	identified	(Kahan	&	Klausner	1997;	Choi	&	Gulati	2004).	Moreover,	the	risks	
posed	by	linguistic	uncertainties	may	not	always	be	fully	priced.	To	the	extent	those	tasked	with	
drafting	the	contract	(the	agents)	only	care	about	those	matters	that	are	priced,	the	result	is	
that	arbitrage	opportunities	remain	for	the	clever	firm	that	can	identify	the	opportunities,	
purchase	the	underlying	contractual	rights	and	then	exploit	the	uncertainties	in	the	contract	to	
capture	a	larger	share	of	those	rights	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	2016).	
	
This	scenario,	where	the	phenomenon	of	uncertainties	in	standard-form	contracts	attracts	
the	attention	of	professional	contract	arbitrageurs,	is	one	that	has	been	playing	out	vividly	over	
recent	years	in	the	context	of	sovereign	debt	litigation.		The	most	recent	and	salient	example	
occurred	in	March	2016	when	Argentina	settled	with	the	arbitrageurs	for	staggering	recoveries	
(up	to	ten	times	their	original	purchase	prices,	according	to	some	estimates,	Levine	2016;	
Porzecanski	2016).		The	story	of	these	contract	arbitrageurs	operating	in	the	sovereign	debt	
markets	started,	however,	more	than	a	decade	and	a	half	ago	in	September	2000,	when	the	
Republic	of	Peru	was	sued	on	a	clause	that	no	one	seemed	to	understand—the	infamous	and	
ubiquitous	pari	passu	clause—that	had	been	found	in	sovereign	debt	contracts	for	over	a	
century	and	a	half.		Peru	ultimately	paid	a	US	hedge	fund,	Elliott	Associates,	around	$55	million	
on	a	debt	that	was	purchased	for	approximately	$11	million	(Gulati	&	Klee	2001).		One	might	
have	thought	that	such	a	large	recovery,	based	on	an	unusual	interpretation	of	a	clause	that	
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was	standard	around	the	world,	would	not	repeat	itself	as	participants	in	this	highly	
sophisticated	market	revised	or	eliminated	the	clause.		As	multiple	researchers	have	noted,	
however,	the	clause	remained	as	part	of	the	standard	package	of	terms	(Varottil	2008,	
Weidemaier,	Gulati	&	Scott	2013,	Nelson	2015).		Indeed,	the	relevant	clauses	remained	
basically	the	same	for	over	a	decade.			
	
While	the	sovereign	debt	contracts	seemed	mired	in	quicksand,	the	world	of	contract	
arbitrageurs	was	not.	The	spectacular	returns	plainly	visible	as	a	result	of	the	Peru	case	
attracted	other	funds	eager	to	copy	the	Elliott	Associates’	strategy.1		As	a	result	of	these	
recoveries,	and	subsequent	ones	where	sovereigns	have	settled	cases	instead	of	litigating	
against	holdout	creditors,	contractual	arbitrage	has	become	a	lucrative	business	in	the	
sovereign	space.2		When	countries	are	close	to	defaulting	on	their	debts	these	days,	there	are	a	
host	of	financial	firms	that	begin	parsing	their	contracts,	looking	for	linguistic	uncertainties	that	
have	not	been	fully	priced	and	thus	can	be	exploited	when	the	default	occurs.		Greece	faced	
this	in	its	restructuring	in	2012	when	it	found	that	a	subset	of	smart	creditors	had	identified	the	
best	contracts	to	hold	out	on	and	refused	to	take	the	60%	plus	Net	Present	Value	haircut	that	
Greece	was	trying	to	impose	on	every	bondholder	(the	smart	money	got	paid	in	full,	whilst	the	
others	got	brutal	haircuts)	(Zettelmeyer,	Trebesch	&	Gulati	2013).		Ukraine	faced	a	large	group	
of	sophisticated	creditors	in	its	restructuring	in	2015	(Gelpern,	Heller	&	Setser	2016).		And	
Puerto	Rico	and	Venezuela	are	dealing	with	a	subset	of	these	creditors	as	of	this	writing	
(Mahler	&	Confessore	2015,	Scigliuzzo	2016,	Wigglesworth	&	Moore	2016).	And	the	
aforementioned	Argentine	litigation	spilled	even	more	blood	in	the	water	only	a	few	months	
																																																						
1	Elliott,	was	not	the	first	creditor	to	utilize	a	holdout	strategy	against	a	sovereign	debtor	trying	to	restructure;	its	
fame	derived	from	its	effectiveness.		For	discussions	of	the	pre	Elliott	holdouts	and	the	evolution	of	such	
strategies,	see	Schumacher,	Trebesch	&	Enderlein	(2012);	Blackmun	&	Mukhi	(2010).		
	
2	Hedge	funds	such	as	Elliott	Associates	have	also	been	active	in	the	corporate	bond	contract	space,	utilizing	similar	
strategies.	See	Rock	&	Kahan	(2009).			
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ago	when	it	ended	up	paying	the	most	aggressive	of	holdout	creditors	between	300	and	800%	
of	the	principal	amount	of	their	claims	(Levine	2016).3	
	
The	experience	of	the	past	decade	and	a	half	in	the	sovereign	debt	markets	should	teach	us	
at	least	one	lesson:	the	assumption	that	sophisticated	markets	will	move	quickly	to	eliminate	
gaps	and	uncertainties	in	standard-form	contracts	is	wrong—at	least	in	the	sovereign	debt	
world	(although	we	suspect	this	phenomenon	is	generalizable).		In	a	related	paper,	we	show	
empirically	that	contractual	change	has	been	immensely	hard	to	induce	in	the	sovereign	debt	
markets,	even	where	powerful	international	institutions	such	as	the	International	Monetary	
Fund,	the	United	States	Treasury	and	the	Paris	Club	have	attempted	to	coordinate	and	
encourage	change	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	2016,	Scott	&	Gulati	2013).	
	
The	foregoing	poses	a	simple	global	governance	question.		If	the	standard	answer	that	“the	
market	will	quickly	and	easily	fix	linguistic	uncertainties	in	contracts”	does	not	hold,	what	else	
can	be	done	to	address	the	problems	caused	by	the	growth	of	the	contract	arbitrageur?	The	
answer	we	propose	is	to	look	to	the	courts	to	revise	their	approach	to	the	interpretation	of	
standard-form	contracts.		This	recommendation	is	a	deviation	from	the	typical	assumption	that	
sophisticated	parties	are	better	able	to	address	problems	in	their	boilerplate	contracts	than	are	
generalist	courts.			After	all,	the	parties	should	know	what	they	were	trying	to	communicate	in	
their	contracts	better	than	a	generalist	court	viewing	the	dispute	in	hindsight	long	after	the	deal	
was	done.		But	this	assumption	no	longer	holds	if	the	contracting	parties	themselves	have	little	
or	no	understanding	of	the	ex	ante	meaning	of	key	provisions	in	their	contracts;	provisions	they	
continue	to	use	because	they	are	part	of	a	general	market	standard	package.		In	such	a	case,	we	
argue,	courts	can	ameliorate	the	problem	of	contract	arbitrage	by	adopting	new	techniques	for	
interpreting	standard	form	boilerplate.	
	
II. When	Contract	Terms	Become	Rote	and	Encrusted	
																																																						
3	For	a	discussion	of	the	increase	the	potency	of	the	remedies	being	obtained	by	holdout	creditors,	as	represented	
by	the	enforcement	mechanism	authorized	by	the	New	York	judges	against	Argentina,	see	Weidemaier	&	Gelpern,	
(2014).	
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The	basic	question	that	courts	face	whenever	they	are	asked	to	interpret	a	standard	
provision	in	a	commercial	contract	is	how	to	determine	what	the	parties	understood	that	
provision	to	mean	when	they	contracted.		The	interpretive	goal	in	contract	cases	is	to	recover	
and	then	enforce	the	parties’	apparent	intentions,	as	they	existed	at	the	time	of	contract.		This	
goal	implies	that	courts	will	attempt	to	interpret	even	ambiguous	terms	in	a	manner	consistent	
with	the	ex	ante	intentions	of	the	contracting	parties	in	so	far	as	a	court	can	recover	those	
intentions	from	the	contract	or	the	surrounding	context.4		But	in	the	case	of	linguistic	
uncertainty,	some	standardized	terms	in	boilerplate	contracts	between	sophisticated	parties	
have	lost	any	recoverable	meaning.		Here	courts	may	be	practically	incapable	of	recovering	a	
plausible	meaning	that	was	attached	to	the	terms	by	the	contracting	parties	at	the	time	the	
contract	was	drafted.	
		
The	dilemma	that	courts	face	when	interpreting	boilerplate	is	an	inherent	cost	of	the	
reliance	on	standardized	contract	terms	in	commercial	contracts.	Boilerplate	terms	are	
ubiquitous	in	commercial	contracting	because	they	offer	the	efficiency	advantages	of	
standardization.		Those	advantages	include	the	development	of	a	uniform	system	of	
communication	that	is	independent	of	any	particular	contractual	context	(Goetz	&	Scott	1985).	
Thus,	parties	in	heterogeneous	environments	who	wish	to	communicate	a	shared	intent	can	
embody	that	intent	in	a	fixed	and	reliable	formulation	whose	meaning	does	not	vary	with	the	
nature	of	the	contract	or	its	context.		Unfortunately,	the	very	elements	of	fixed	and	unchanging	
meaning	that	make	boilerplate	terms	attractive	are	the	same	elements	that	can	contribute	to	
the	erosion	of	that	meaning	over	time.		In	addition	to	the	ordinary	risks	of	obsolescence,	the	
repetitious	use	of	boilerplate	has	two	pernicious	effects	that	render	the	life	span	of	some	
boilerplate	terms	needlessly	short.	
	
																																																						
4	Intention	is	determined	objectively	and	prospectively:		A	party	is	taken	to	mean	what	a	contract	partner	could	
plausibly	believe	it	meant	when	the	parties	contracted.		See	Schwartz	&	Scott	(2003).			
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The	first	effect	is	“rote	usage”:	over	time	some	standardized	terms	get	used	by	rote	so	
consistently	that	they	lose	their	original	meaning.		In	effect,	they	become	platitudes.		
Nonetheless,	the	terms	may	continue	to	be	employed	because	parties	see	no	reason	to	
eliminate	a	term	they	view	as	costless	and	thus	incur	a	risk,	however	small,	of	jeopardizing	the	
understood	meaning	of	their	agreement	(Id.).		“Encrustation”	is	a	second	cost	of	too	much	
repetition:		the	intelligibility	of	language	deteriorates	significantly	as	legal	jargon	is	overlaid	on	
standard	linguistic	formulations.		Rote	usage	and	encrustation	are	related	phenomena	although	
they	may	be	found	independently	in	some	boilerplate	terms.		When	combined	in	a	particular	
clause	or	phrase,	a	term	becomes	linguistically	uncertain:		no	particular	meaning	can	be	
uncovered	that	is	more	probable	than	any	other	meaning.		It	is	important	to	distinguish	
linguistic	uncertainty	from	the	more	familiar	interpretive	challenges	courts	face	when	
interpreting	terms	that	are	ambiguous.	A	term	is	ambiguous	when	it	is	“capable	of	more	than	
one	sensible	and	reasonable	interpretation.”5	Terms	that	are	linguistically	uncertain	in	the	
sense	we	use	here	are	not	ambiguous	but	rather	are	hopelessly	vague:		the	term	in	question	
can	apply	to	an	infinitely	wide	spectrum	of	referents..	
	
	What	is	the	mechanism	that	produces	an	encrustation	that	is	continually	repeated	by	rote	
in	standard	boilerplate?		Senior	lawyers	in	the	sovereign	debt	market	have	described	the	
process	to	us	in	the	following	terms:		Lawyers	hired	to	do	a	deal	for	clients—such	as	a	bond	
offering—are	told	at	the	front	end	that	they	are	to	use	market	standard	forms	as	far	as	
possible.		But,	of	course,	the	deals	have	to	be	tailored	to	the	client’s	needs	as	appropriate.		
Names,	dates,	locations	for	payment,	currencies,	etc.,	have	to	be	changed	from	whatever	prior	
deal	document	is	being	used	as	a	template.		The	assumption	of	the	clients	is	that	the	lawyers	
possess	the	expertise	to	make	the	necessary	marginal	modifications	to	the	standard	forms	to	
insure	that	they	both	fit	the	client's	preferences	and	do	not	depart	significantly	from	what	the	
market	would	consider	the	“standard	package.”		But	the	lawyers	working	with	standard	form	
language	that	has	been	repeated	for	many	years	by	rote	(and	therefore	is	part	of	the	market	
standard	to	which	only	marginal	modifications	can	be	made)	are	unlikely	to	have	much	if	any	
																																																						
5	Ross	Bros.	Constr.	Co.	v.	State	ex	rel	Transp/	Comm’n	Highway	Div.	650	P.	2d	1080	(1982).	
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understanding	of	the	purpose(s)	served	by	these	terms.		The	combination	then,	of	having	to	
make	marginal	modifications	to	the	contract	terms	to	suit	the	needs	of	the	transaction,	and	a	
lack	of	understanding	of	the	terms	function,	can	result	in	the	insertions	of	legal	jargon	to	
attempt	to	add	some	clarity	to	the	terms.		These	insertions	can	occur	with	greater	frequency	
when	the	attorneys	involved	have	less	experience	with	the	particular	boilerplate	term.		
Encrustation	can	thus	result	from	tinkering	with	standard	language	whose	contemporary	
meaning	is	unclear	to	the	drafter.		To	be	sure,	tinkering	may	occur	in	other	contexts	as	well.		
But	there	are	greater	error-correction	mechanisms	for	those	boilerplate	terms	that	do	have	
understood	meaning	and	frequent	usage.		Later	attorneys	that	see	a	variation	of	a	boilerplate	
term	with	understood	meaning	and	usage	will	be	less	likely	to	follow	the	variation	if	earlier	
tinkering	has	changed	this	meaning	and	usage.		Where	a	term	has	lost	meaning	however,	these	
error-correcting	mechanisms	will	not	apply,	leading	to	increasing	uncertainty	in	the	meaning	of	
the	words	in	the	boilerplate	term.	
	
The	result	of	the	encrustation	process	is	that	the	communicative	properties	of	boilerplate	
terms	are	weakened,	reducing	even	further	their	reliability	as	signals	of	what	the	parties	really	
mean	(Goetz	&	Scott	1985).	Indeed,	we	have	found	instances	where	the	“popularity”	of	the	
clause	can	increase	as	it	is	repeated	by	rote	and	becomes	more	encrusted.		Widespread	use	of	
such	a	clause	occurs,	even	after	it	ceases	to	have	substantive	content,	because	it’s	rote	
repetition	means	that	is	becomes	part	of	the	“check	list”	of	terms	that	are	always	present	in	all	
such	contracts	(Gulati	&	Scott	2013;	Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	2016).	
	
Whenever	boilerplate	terms	lose	their	meaning,	either	through	rote	usage	or	encrustation,	
there	is	a	heightened	risk	that	courts	may	be	persuaded	to	adopt	an	interpretation	of	the	
term(s)	at	issue	that	is	unexpected	and	upsets	the	overall	bargain	between	the	commercial	
parties	in	the	contract.6		And	the	costs	to	the	system	of	that	erroneous	interpretation,	if	the	
clause	has	become	widely	used,	can	be	high	as	the	recent	experience	with	sovereign	debt	
																																																						
6	British	lawyer,	Philip	Wood,	has	described	the	process	of	encrustation	as	akin	to	that	of	barnacles	accumulating	
on	a	ship’s	hull	(Wood	2009,	at	9).		
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boilerplate	has	vividly	illustrated.		To	be	sure,	the	standard	assumption	among	both	commercial	
lawyers	and	legal	academics	is	that	the	risks	of	rote	usage	and	encrustation	are	small:		the	costs	
of	judicial	error	will	be	limited	to	an	isolated	case	of	an	aberrant	interpretation.		This	belief	is	
supported	by	the	reasonable	assumption	that	sophisticated	commercial	parties	can	(and	are	
motivated	to)	readily	correct	a	court’s	interpretive	mistakes.		Indeed,	given	(a)	the	important	
role	that	standardization	plays	in	replicating	boilerplate	terms	in	literally	tens	of	thousands	of	
commercial	contracts,	and	(b)	the	non-trivial	possibility	that	a	court	may	err	in	interpreting	
those	terms	that	are	infected	with	rote	usage	and/or	encrustation,	commercial	parties	have	
strong	incentives	to	ensure	that	their	standardized	contract	terms	are	continually	revised	to	
ensure	that	the	common	meaning	is	preserved.		After	all,	conventional	wisdom	holds	that	
commercial	parties	want	to	reduce	uncertainty	in	so	far	as	possible	and,	given	the	scale	of	the	
problem,	leaving	encrusted	boilerplate	provisions	unchanged	produces	unacceptable	levels	of	
uncertainty.	
	
But	what	if	the	foregoing	assumption	of	how	markets	will	spontaneously	adjust	by	
correcting	the	errors	caused	by	encrustation	is	incorrect?		It	is	after	all	an	assumption	based	on	
little	in	the	way	of	empirical	or	theoretical	work	on	what	one	might	call	the	production	process	
of	boilerplate	contracts.	What	if	there	are	circumstances	where	sophisticated	commercial	
parties	systematically	fail	to	react	promptly	to	what	are	widely	perceived	to	be	judicial	errors	in	
interpreting	boilerplate	terms,	or	are	unable	thereafter	easily	to	convert	the	encrusted	
boilerplate	into	a	new	and	intelligible	formulation?		Worse	still,	what	if	the	rote	usage	and	
encrustation	dynamic	is	increasing	over	time?		Finally,	what	if	there	are	daunting	collective	
action	problems	that	impair	the	efforts	of	public	institutions	to	assist	the	market	in	clarifying	
the	meaning	of	the	encrusted	boilerplate	terms?	
	
The	foregoing	conditions	appear	to	describe	the	peculiar	case	of	the	pari	passu	clause,	a	
standard	boilerplate	formulation	common	to	sovereign	debt	contracts	for	close	to	200	years.		In	
the	era	of	the	modern	bond	markets,	the	first	disputed	interpretation	of	the	clause	occurred	in	
Brussels,	in	September	2000,	in	a	case	against	the	Republic	of	Peru,	was	affirmed	by	a	different	
Draft:	June	12,	2016	
Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Governance	(2016)	
	
	 9	
court	in	a	case	against	the	Republic	of	Argentina	in	December	2011,	and	affirmed	again	on	
appeal	in	that	same	case	in	October	2012	and	August	2013.7		In	each	of	these	cases,	the	courts	
endorsed	a	ratable	payments	interpretation	of	pari	passu	that	required	hold	out	creditors	to	be	
paid	in	full	as	a	condition	to	the	sovereigns	paying	consenting	creditors	under	a	restructuring	
agreement.		Even	though	this	interpretation	effectively	undermined	efforts	by	sovereigns	to	
restructure	their	bonds,	meaningful	change	in	the	language	of	the	boilerplate	term	did	not	
begin	to	appear	until	late	2014.		And,	as	of	this	writing	in	May	2016,	while	one	segment	of	the	
sovereign	market	(the	most	elite	segment,	made	up	of	the	pure	sovereigns)	has	repudiated	the	
Brussels	2000	interpretation	wholesale,	change	in	the	other	segments	(quasi-sovereigns)	is	
barely	showing	signs	of	beginning.		In	a	sister	article,	we	ask	the	questions:	why	did	this	action	
take	15	years	(during	which	thousands	of	sovereign	and	quasi-sovereign	bonds	worth	trillions	of	
dollars	were	issued	with	the	problematic	clause),	what	kinds	of	efforts	had	to	be	made	to	
induce	changes,	and	what	were	the	market	consequences	of	the	delay?	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	
2016).		Taking	the	answers	our	research	generated,	the	question	we	tackle	here	is	whether	
there	is	a	way	to	solve	the	problem	sooner	and	better	using	the	courts.	
	
Under	the	circumstances	presented	by	the	pari	passu	saga,	if	the	costs	of	delay	are	
sufficiently	high	(the	above	mentioned	research	suggests	that	they	were),	and	if	the	costs	of	
inducing	change	in	response	to	judicial	error	are	similarly	high	(again,	this	is	what	believe	the	
research	to	show),	the	standard	interpretive	command	to	courts	to	“find”	what	the	parties	to	
the	litigation	“meant”	by	the	boilerplate	terms	may	be	misguided.		Instead,	social	welfare	
considerations	support	interpreting	boilerplate	terms	“infected”	by	rote	usage	or	encrustation	
in	ways	that	reduce	the	costs	of	an	erroneous	interpretation.	This	argues,	in	turn,	for	a	shift	in	
contract	doctrine	away	from	the	entirely	futile	and	ultimately	costly	effort	to	discover	a	
meaning	that	no	longer	exists.8		
																																																						
7	The	key	decisions	were	Elliott	Associates	v.	Republic	of	Peru	2000/QR/92	(Ct.	App.	Brussels,	8th	Chamber,	Sept.	
26,	2000);	Order,	NML	Capital,	Ltd.	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	____(S.D.N.Y.	Dec.	7,	2011)	(No.	08	Civ.	6978),	2011	
WL	9522565,	at	*2;	NML	Capital,	Ltd.	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	699	F.3d	246	(2d	Cir.	2012).	
	
8	The	underlying	canon	of	contract	interpretation	directs	courts	to	give	every	term	and	clause	in	a	contract	a	
meaning,	under	the	assumption	that	parties	have	drafted	terms	in	contract	to	convey	their	collective	purposes.	
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	To	be	sure,	the	extent	of	rote	usage	and	encrustation	in	commonly	used	boilerplate	
remains	an	open	question,	and	distinguishing	encrusted	terms	from	those	whose	meaning	can	
be	discerned	by	a	court	remains	an	essential	requirement	of	any	change	in	interpretive	
approach.		But	what	the	case	of	the	pari	passu	clause	suggests	is	that	changing	boilerplate	
terms	can	take	years	and	the	process	can	prove	enormously	costly;	particularly	in	terms	of	the	
bonds	worth	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	being	issued	with	suboptimal	contract	terms	in	the	
interim	period.	Those	costs	support	our	claim	that	a	search	for	party	intent	is	both	futile	and	
counterproductive	when	boilerplate	with	these	characteristics	is	included	in	industry	contracts.		
Instead,	we	argue	that	courts	should	adopt	an	interpretative	rule	that	recognizes	the	reality:		
when	encrusted	boilerplate	is	repeated	by	rote	for	many	years	without	legal	challenge,	and	no	
party	has	reason	to	know	a	different	meaning	attached	to	the	clause	by	another	party,	the	
clause	is	legally	meaningless	and	should	not	be	given	operational	effect.		Put	differently,	the	
canon	of	contract	interpretation	that	directs	courts	to	give	every	provision	in	a	contract	a	
meaning—under	the	assumption	that	provisions	in	contract	are	there	only	because	the	parties	
want	them	there	for	a	reason—should	be	ignored	in	the	set	of	cases	where	the	provisions	in	
question	can	be	identified	as	encrusted	and	whose	meaning	has	been	lost.	To	hold	otherwise	is	
to	risk	imposing	decades-long	costs	on	the	affected	market.		
	
III. Getting	the	Courts	to	Change	Their	Interpretive	Strategy	
	
	 As	noted	above,	our	sister	paper	reports	on	the	data	we	collected	on	the	evolution	of	
the	pari	passu	clause	through	multiple	litigations,	the	most	prominent	of	which	were	the	hedge	
fund	attacks	on	Peru	and	Argentina	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	2016).		At	first	glance	the	empirical	
evidence	we	collected—both	quantitative	and	qualitative—seems	puzzling	and	even	
confounding.		Contract	theory	predicts	that	contract	drafters	will	promptly	revise	standard	
																																																																																																																																																																														
The	Second	Circuit,	NML	v.	Argentina,	put	it	this	way:	“A	contract	should	not	be	interpreted	in	such	a	way	as	would	
leave	one	of	its	provisions	substantially	without	force	or	effect.”			NML	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	69	F.3d	246,	__	(2d	
Cir.	2012)	(citing	Singh	v.	Atakhanian,	818,	N.Y.S.2d	524,	526	(N.Y.	App.	Div.	2d	Dep’t	2006)).		
	
Draft:	June	12,	2016	
Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Governance	(2016)	
	
	 11	
contract	terms	when	faced	with	an	interpretation	adverse	to	their	client’s	interests.		That	
relatively	few	changes	were	made	to	the	pari	passu	boilerplate	for	over	three	years	after	
federal	courts	in	New	York	indorsed	the	ratable	payments	interpretation	in	the	litigation	
involving	Argentina	(and	roughly	fifteen	years	after	the	Brussels	decision	involving	Peru)	is	
perplexing.		While	some	issuers	inserted	disclosures	attempting	to	explain	to	investors	the	risk	
that	courts	may	misinterpret	the	issuers'	existing	pari	passu	clauses,	only	a	handful	of	issuers	in	
the	first	several	years	after	the	Southern	District	of	New	York's	pari	passu	decision	in	2011	
actually	changed	the	language	of	the	clause.		The	foregoing	is	especially	perplexing	because	the	
drafting	lawyers,	and	the	entire	sovereign	bond	industry,	were	nearly	unanimous	in	
condemning	the	series	of	judicial	decisions	that	permitted	the	contractual	arbitrage	strategies	
of	the	holdout	creditors	to	prevail.		Moreover,	when	clarifying	revisions	to	the	pari	passu	
clauses	eventually	began	to	appear,	they	seemed	to	be	prompted	by	two	conferences	held	in	
New	York	in	late	fall	of	2014	rather	than	by	the	succession	of	adverse	court	decisions	by	the	
leading	commercial	courts	in	the	U.S.		Adding	to	the	mystery,	the	clarifying	revisions	that	began	
appearing	in	many	bond	issues	in	late	2014	were	limited	to	bonds	issued	directly	by	a	sovereign	
(pure	sovereign	bonds).		But	almost	no	similar	changes	have	as	of	this	writing	yet	been	made	to	
pari	passu	clauses	in	bonds	issued	by	quasi-sovereigns	(cities,	regions,	state	owned	companies	
with	sovereign	guarantees)	even	where	those	bonds	in	some	cases	are	guaranteed	by	the	same	
sovereigns	whose	own	pari	passu	clauses	had	been	“repaired.”	
	
	 Notwithstanding	the	apparent	contradictions,	and	as	we	explain	in	Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	
(2016),	a	story	does	emerge	from	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	data.		We	don’t	suggest	that	
this	is	the	only	story	that	explains	the	pari	passu	puzzle,	but	it	is	the	only	explanation	that	fits	all	
the	data	sources	we	have	collected.		After	describing	below	the	story	that	emerges	from	our	
quantitative	and	qualitative	data,	we	then	address	the	question	with	which	we	began:	what	
interpretive	rule	would	motivate	courts	to	better	determine	the	common	meaning	in	encrusted	
boilerplate	like	the	pari	passu	clause?	
	
A. A	Collective	Action	Story	(With	a	Heavy	Dose	of	Agency	Costs)	
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	 Various	inertia	costs	may	deter	any	individual	market	participant	from	inducing	a	
change	in	a	boilerplate	term.		A	change	to	the	contract	language	that	closes	off	holdouts	in	
cases	involving	a	newly	issued	bond	might	put	the	unchanged	clauses	in	prior	bonds	of	that	
sovereigns	at	greater	risk	of	enabling	holdouts	(if	the	judge	takes	a	negative	inference	about	
the	meaning	of	the	old	clauses	from	the	fact	that	there	was	a	change).		There	will	be	some	
uncertainty	as	to	how	investors	will	react	to	a	new	clause;	especially	if	the	sovereign	using	the	
clause	is	an	early	mover.		Investors	may	have	a	preference	for	the	“standard”	package	of	terms,	
whatever	they	are.		Changing	a	term	poses	the	risk	that	the	bond	will	be	viewed	as	non	
standard.		No	one	knows	for	sure	how	courts	will	interpret	the	new	term,	particularly	if	the	
problematic	interpretation	of	the	old	clause	gets	reversed	by	a	higher	court.	
	
	 If	the	market	participants	in	the	sophisticated	sovereign	bond	market—including	the	
elite	lawyers	and	their	clients	(the	sovereigns	and	the	investors	or,	more	properly,	the	agents	
for	the	sovereigns	and	the	investors)—acted	together,	they	could	overcome	many	of	these	
inertia	costs.		If	the	market	as	a	whole	put	forward	a	new	market	standard	with	a	clear	
interpretation	of	the	intent	of	this	standard	(for	example,	to	overturn	what	the	market	viewed	
as	the	SDNY’s	erroneous	interpretation	of	the	pari	passu	clause),	then	this	act	by	the	market	as	
a	whole	would	establish	a	new	standard	accepted	by	investors,	reduce	the	legal	uncertainty	on	
how	this	new	standard	would	be	interpreted,	and	minimize	the	risk	that	courts	would	view	the	
new	standard	as	creating	a	negative	inference	on	how	to	interpret	the	existing	stock	of	old	
clauses.	
	
	 Getting	market	participants	to	act	together	however	is	not	easy.		The	best	explanation	
of	the	pari	passu	puzzle,	we	believe,	is	a	variant	of	a	collective	action	problem:		The	individual	
interests	of	the	key	market	participants	are	inconsistent	with	those	parties’	collective	interests.		
The	private	interests	of	the	elite	lawyers	are	the	mirror	image	of	their	de	facto	clients,	the	debt	
managers,	the	agents	of	the	sovereigns,	and	the	investment	banks,	the	agents	of	the	investors.		
And	both	sets	of	agents	are	subject	to	hyperbolic	discounting	relative	to	the	sovereigns	and	
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investors:	the	agents	are	motivated	to	minimize	the	ex	ante	costs	of	a	bond	issue	(transaction	
costs	plus	price	discounts)	even	where	expected	ex	post	costs	(restructuring	cost,	the	cost	of	
holdouts,	etc.)	are	thereby	increased	by	an	even	greater	amount.9			In	contrast,	the	collective	
interests	of	the	same	set	of	elite	lawyers	are	to	protect	the	“industry”	and	the	market	for	
sovereign	bonds	so	that	future	issuances	proceed	smoothly	and	future	business	can	grow.		The	
public	sector	(the	IMF,	the	U.S.	Treasury,	etc.,)	and	the	industry	trade	associations	(ICMA,	IIF)	
do	internalize	the	collective	problem	but	they	are	helpless	to	act	until	they	are	able	to	assemble	
the	critical	mass	of	key	players	to	coordinate	on	the	best	way	to	reject	the	ratable	payments	
interpretation.		This	is	because	any	revision	to	the	clause	has	to	be	“settled”	among	the	key	
players,	since	those	same	private	interests	demand	“standard”	legal	terms	that	minimize	the	ex	
ante	costs	of	placing	the	bonds	in	the	market.		And	this	demand	for	standard	terms	is	
particularly	high	if	the	term	in	question	is	one	that	is	on	the	proverbial	checklist;	that	is,	the	
type	of	term	that	one	expects	to	see	if	one	has	a	sovereign	bond.10	
	
This	collective	action	story	supports	an	agency	cost	hypothesis	and	explains	the	
apparent	inconsistency	between	the	expressions	of	outrage	by	the	elite	bar	and	their	
concomitant	unwillingness	to	effect	any	change	in	the	standard	boilerplate	language.	It	also	
explains	why	there	finally	was	substantial	movement	to	revise	the	pure	sovereign	issuances	in	
the	late	fall	of	2014	and	why	the	apparently	coordinated	decision	to	revise	pari	passu	was	not	
followed	in	the	quasi-sovereign	bonds	that	were	issued	during	the	same	time	frame.	In	what	
follows,	we	support	the	collective	action/agency	cost	story	by	describing	in	more	detail	the	
respective	individual	and	collective	interests	of	each	of	the	principal	parties.	
	
																																																						
9	Excessive	discounting	by	agents	thus	leads	to	bond	issuances	that	are	less	efficient	than	they	could	be.	An	
efficient	sovereign	bond	contract	optimizes	total	contracting	costs	by	trading	off	the	ex	ante	or	front	end	costs	of	
the	contract	and	the	ex	post	or	back	end	costs	of	default.		See	Scott	&	Triantis	(2006).		
	
10	One	way	to	understand	the	stickiness	of	terms	that	make	it	on	to	the	check	list	is	to	see	them	as	category	
defining	terms.		Scholars	in	sociology	have	long	observed	the	importance	attached,	even	by	sophisticated	market	
actors,	to	whether	products	fit	certain	defined	categories–e.g.,	a	vehicle	is	not	a	car	unless	it	has	four	wheels,	and	
only	if	it	is	a	car,	will	it	get	rated	by	car	magazines	and	evaluated	by	car	experts	and	sold	by	car	dealers	and	so	on.	
On	this,	see	Zuckerman	(1999).	
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a.		The	elite	lawyers:		The	private	interest	of	each	of	the	elite	lawyers	who	dominate	the	
sovereign	bond	market	is	to	process	bond	issues	at	the	least	ex	ante	cost	and	as	quickly	as	
possible,	notwithstanding	expected	default	costs.		This	single	minded	focus	on	front	end	
contracting	costs	is	simply	a	reflection	of	the	fact	that	the	“legal	terms”	for	which	the	lawyers	
are	responsible	and	that	form	the	standard	boilerplate	are	seen	as	immaterial	in	the	initial	
pricing	of	the	bonds.	Thus,	any	change	in	the	risk	of	default	that	results	from	a	change	in	the	
legal	terms	of	the	contract	is	ignored	by	both	the	debt	managers	(who	act	as	agent	for	the	
sovereign)	and	the	investment	bank	(that	serves	as	agent	for	the	investors).		In	short,	the	ex	
ante	legal	meaning	of	pari	passu	is	irrelevant:	the	clause	is	essentially	meaningless	
encrustation.		Nevertheless,	the	pari	passu	clause	remains	as	part	of	the	bonds’	contractual	
boilerplate	because	it	is	part	of	the	"standard	form,"	and	standardization	is	valued	because	it	
reduces	ex	ante	contracting	costs	(Goetz	&	Scott	1985,	Kahan	&	Klausner	1997).			While	elite	
lawyers,	if	they	could	coordinate,	would	value	addressing	the	ambiguity	in	the	pari	passu	clause	
that	may	increase	costs	associated	with	ex	post	holdouts	and	harm	the	overall	market,	the	
collective	action	problem	facing	the	group	of	elite	lawyers	as	well	as	the	hyperbolic	discounting	
on	the	part	of	the	agent	debt	managers	and	investment	banks	deters	concerted	efforts	at	
change.	
	
When	Elliot	Associates	succeeded	in	having	a	court	adopt	the	ratable	payments	
interpretation	in	Brussels	in	2000,	the	elite	bar	was	outraged	but	not	because	any	lawyer’s	
individual	interests	were	imperiled.		As	we	know,	their	clients	did	not	care.		The	elite	lawyers	
were	outraged	(in	unison	with	the	public	sector	and	other	collective	groups)	because	they	saw	
that	the	ratable	payment	interpretation	imperiled	the	very	health	of	the	industry	itself.		If	
bonds	in	default	cannot	be	restructured	then,	over	time,	the	pressure	from	the	contract	
arbitrageurs	whenever	a	sovereign	faces	default	will	reduce	the	demand	for	issuing	debt	in	this	
form	and	the	robust	market	for	sovereign	bonds	will	be	negatively	impacted.		This	means	a	
future	decline	in	a	lucrative	legal	business.	The	collective	interests	of	the	lawyers	who	dominate	
this	industry	is	to	maintain	a	healthy	and	thriving	sovereign	bond	market	where	bond	issues	are	
produced	on	an	assembly	line.			And	this	way	of	doing	business	was	threatened.		
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At	the	same	time,	these	lawyers	had	no	incentive	to	revise	the	standard	terms	for	their	
individual	clients.		The	debt	managers	for	the	sovereigns	do	not	care	about	the	legal	terms	at	
the	time	of	issuance:	they	do	not	regard	the	legal	terms	as	relevant	to	the	initial	pricing	of	their	
bonds	because	they	know	that	the	investment	banks	charged	with	marketing	the	bonds	only	
care	about	having	the	standard	form.		Moreover,	the	clients	affirmatively	discourage	
individualized	deviations	from	the	boilerplate	formulation	because	non-standard	legal	terms	
make	the	initial	issuance	more	difficult	and	costly	to	get	to	market.		Thus,	the	lawyers	
repeatedly	demanded	that	the	state	solve	the	problem	but	did	nothing	themselves	other	than	
to	offer	empty	platitudes	about	why	they	failed	to	act.	
	
	This	saga	continued	for	nearly	15	years	until	one	lawyer	at	a	October	2014	Columbia	
University	conference	committed	a	gaffe	by	saying:	“We	don’t	know	how	to	respond	to	this	
problem	because	the	interests	of	our	clients	are	not	identical	and	many	clients	do	not	ask	for	
(or	want)	any	change	in	the	standard	legal	terms.”		The	evidence	we	have	points	to	the	fact	that	
this	session,	and	the	subsequent	meeting	of	an	elite	subset	of	the	same	group	(with	some	
additions)	several	weeks	later	at	the	New	York	Fed,	was	the	impetus	for	coordinating	a	move	to	
a	revised	standard	(and	equally	meaningless)	pari	passu	clause.		The	lingering	agency	problem	
for	the	elite	bar	is	that	the	de	jure	client	is	the	"true	sovereign"—the	people	or	at	least	the	duly	
constituted	government—and	not	just	the	debt	managers.		And	it	is	not	at	all	clear	that	those	
interests	are	advanced	by	treating	all	sovereigns	as	having	the	same	default	risk	and	issuing	
standardized	boilerplate	for	sovereign	bonds	despite	the	apparent	variance	in	the	probability	of	
a	future	restructuring	between	first	world	countries	and	developing	nations.		
	
b.		The	sovereigns.		The	sovereign’s	interests	are	also	skewed	by	an	agency	
problem.		The	agents	(the	debt	managers)	are	only	motivated	to	consider	the	sovereign’s	
immediate	interests	(low	transaction	costs	and	a	good	initial	price).		Yet,	many	sovereigns	also	
have	a	long-term	interest	in	having	the	capacity	to	restructure	their	bonds	as	economic	
conditions	change	and	the	threat	of	a	default	is	real.		These	long-term	interests	are,	however,	
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typically	underrepresented	in	the	state’s	bureaucracy	where	politicians	and	state	officials	often	
focus	on	the	immediate	short-term	(corresponding	to	their	tenure	in	office).		This	short-term	
focus	of	the	state’s	bureaucracy	translates	into	short-term	incentives	imposed	on	debt	
managers.		Thus,	the	debt	manager	only	cares	about	what	the	investors	claim	to	care	about—
the	business	terms	that	they	believe	do	influence	bond	prices—and	they	want	the	legal	terms	
to	remain	unchanged	and	uncontroversial	so	as	to	secure	the	best	initial	price	at	the	lowest	
issuance	cost.		In	short,	the	sovereign's	agents	engage	in	hyperbolic	discounting	because	that	is	
what	they	are	paid	to	do.	Nevertheless,	theory	predicts	that	some	(many)	sovereigns	will	have	
issued	bonds	prior	to	the	revisions	to	pari	passu	that	risk	imposing	substantial	costs	on	their	
county's	citizens.			
	
c.		The	investors.		But	why	don’t	the	investors	who	buy	the	bonds	care	about	the	ability	
to	restructure	in	the	event	of	default?		This	is	a	difficult	question,	but	one	hypothesis	is	that	it	is	
too	costly	to	try	and	match	a	given	sovereign	with	the	optimal	clause.		Some	sovereigns	may	
present	a	measurable	default	risk	while	others	may	not,	and	the	information	to	make	
particularized	ex	ante	calculations	is	costly	to	acquire	especially	in	a	world	of	encrusted	
boilerplate	of	uncertain	meaning.		The	same	holds	for	the	information	needed	to	quantify	how	
changes	in	pari	passu	will	alter	the	present	value	of	future	repayment	if	default	occurs.			A	
rationalist	skeptic	might	ask:	Why	is	the	market	so	imperfect?		Behavioral	theory	may	explain	
part	of	the	answer	as	being	a	function	of	excessive	discounting.		Another	consideration	is	the	
fact	that	this	is	a	liquid	market	where	bonds	can	easily	be	resold	on	the	secondary	market.		In	
such	an	environment,	the	business	terms	are	a	good	enough	proxy	for	future	default	risks	
especially	where	boilerplate	terms	have	been	stripped	over	time	of	comprehensible	legal	
consequences.		
	
But	the	preceding	does	not	answer	one	remaining	question:	If	Jay	Newman,	Elliot’s	
legendary	contract	arbitrageur,	prides	himself	on	reading	the	bond	contracts	once	default	
looms	in	order	to	capture	rents	as	a	hold	out	creditor,	then	doesn’t	it	follow	that	he	and	other	
vulture	fund	hotshots	will	read	the	bond	contracts	at	the	time	of	issuance	as	well?		This	means	
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there	should	be	arbitrage	in	the	primary	market	where	smart	investors	are	buying	bonds	
selectively	based	on	their	reading	of	the	legal	terms	because	even	if	they	don’t	plan	to	be	there	
when	the	default	hits,	they	know	that	Jay	Newman	and	others	will	pay	them	a	higher	price	for	
the	bonds	with	better	contract	terms	in	that	near-default	scenario.		To	be	sure,	investors	act	as	
though	the	risk	of	a	default	without	the	ability	to	restructure	is	too	remote	to	affect	initial	
price.		But	will	the	market	adjust	if	the	vulture	funds	engage	in	arbitrage	ex	ante	as	well	as	ex	
post?			
	
Let's	try	a	simple	thought	experiment:		Assume	sellers	and	buyers	are	selling	#1	
corn:		the	standardization	criterion	is	critical	to	the	market	because	it	reduces	search	
costs.		Assume	as	well	that	1%	of	all	#1	corn	will	rot	before	it	reaches	the	ultimate	consumer.		
Assume	finally	that	consumers	absorb	½	of	the	$18	costs	of	rotting	and	wholesalers	absorb	the	
other	½	and	that	investigation	costs	to	identify	that	1%	before	the	corn	is	sold	to	the	wholesale	
market	are	$10.		Here	is	it	rational	for	wholesale	buyers	not	to	spend	$10	to	search	for	the	
telltale	signs	of	future	rot	in	order	to	save	$9	in	discard	costs.	In	short,	so	long	as	the	initial	
investors	only	bear	some	of	the	price	risk	caused	by	legal	arbitrage,	it	still	may	be	rational	for	
them	to	sell	bonds	without	discriminating	among	legal	terms	that	influence	the	costs	of	default.	
	
	d.	The	public	sector	and	industry	associations.		The	IMF,	the	Paris	Club,	the	Institute	of	
International	Finance,	the	International	Capital	Markets	Association	(ICMA)	and	so	on	have	only	
collective	interests.	Why	was	it	so	hard	to	coordinate	with	the	elite	lawyers	and	solve	the	
problem	much	earlier?		The	best	inference	from	our	data	is	that	the	collective	interests	
believed	that	the	expected	costs	of	litigation	in	the	Second	Circuit	and	the	Supreme	Court	
(where	the	initial	New	York	decision	against	Argentina	in	2011	was	appealed	in	2012	and	2013)	
were	lower	than	the	costs	of	coordination	given	that	the	elite	members	of	the	bar	were	
individually	reluctant	to	do	anything.		Thus,	so	long	as	the	courts	could	be	expected	to	“get	it	
right”	in	the	end,	coordination	costs	were	simply	too	onerous.	
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This	then	leaves	the	last	part	of	the	story.		How	did	the	process	of	change	finally	get	
induced	in	mid	to	late	2014?		Recall	that	solving	the	collective	action	problem	not	only	required	
a	willingness	to	consider	the	collective	interest	over	private	interests	but	the	parties	all	had	to	
coordinate	around	a	common	formulation	in	order	to	substitute	a	new	standard	term	in	place	
of	the	defective	one.		At	the	Columbia	conference	in	October	2014,	many	of	the	elite	lawyers	
were	openly	critical	of	the	clarification	to	the	standard	pari	passu	clause	proposed	by	the	IMF	
and	ICMA.		Yet	once	they	were	invited	to	a	second	meeting	limited	to	the	most	elite	among	
them	and	asked	to	participate	in	solving	a	common	problem	of	global	significance,	the	
attendees	quickly	and	easily	reached	an	agreement	and	revisions	began	to	appear	from	that	
point	onward.		Is	it	really	true	that	status	and	flattery	were	all	that	was	needed	to	do	the	
trick?		Was	the	Columbia	conference	an	important	first	step	for	the	elite	bar	to	recognize	that	
they	all	shared	the	same	private	and	collective	interests	(and	that	the	Emperor	had	no	
clothes)?		Our	data	cannot	answer	these	last	questions	but	we	do	know	that	the	elite	lawyers	
who	were	in	the	room	at	both	the	Columbia	and	New	York	Fed	meetings	in	October	2014	
represented	the	“pure”	sovereign	issuers	doing	offerings	under	New	York	and	English	law.		And	
the	market	for	pure	sovereign	bond	issuances	is	precisely	where	the	standard	revision	has	now	
become	the	norm,	whereas	other	lawyers	who	were	not	invited	to	the	meeting	with	the	IMF	
(and	are	often	partners	at	the	same	law	firms	as	the	elite	cohort)	represent	subsidiary	
sovereign	interests	that	have	yet	to	coordinate	around	a	revision	that	rejects	the	ratable	
payments	gloss.		
	
B. What	Should	Courts	do	with	Encrusted	Boilerplate?	
	 	
	 The	Second	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	in	NML	v.	Argentina	approached	the	interpretation	
question	by	relying	on	conventional	contract	doctrine	under	New	York	law.		The	standard	
interpretive	principle	courts	are	instructed	to	use	in	ascertaining	the	meaning	of	a	contract	
term	to	which	both	parties	have	manifested	assent	is	to	look	for	the	shared	intent	of	the	
contracting	parties.		Intent,	in	turn,	is	determined	both	objectively	and	prospectively:	A	party	is	
taken	to	mean	what	its	contract	partner	could	plausibly	believe	it	meant	when	the	parties	
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contracted	(Schwartz	&	Scott	2003).		Textualist	theories	undergird	the	New	York	courts’	
doctrines	of	contractual	interpretation	that	are	designed	to	uncover	the	objectively	reasonable,	
ex	ante	intent	of	the	parties.		Textualist	jurisdictions,	such	as	New	York,	use	a	“hard”	parol	
evidence	rule	that	gives	presumptively	conclusive	effect	to	merger	or	integration	clauses11	and,	
in	the	same	spirit,	this	approach	bars	context	evidence	suggesting	that	parties	intended	to	
impart	non-standard	meaning	to	language	that,	read	alone,	is	unambiguous.12			
	
There	is	a	powerful	justification	for	giving	boilerplate	terms	in	commercial	contracts	
their	plain	or	standard	dictionary	meaning:	a	valuable	state	function	is	to	create	standard	
vocabularies	for	the	conduct	of	commercial	transactions	(Scott	2000).	When	a	phrase	has	a	set,	
easily	discoverable	meaning,	parties	who	use	it	will	know	what	the	phrase	requires	of	them	and	
what	courts	will	say	the	phrase	requires.		By	insulating	the	standard	meaning	of	terms	from	
deviant	interpretations,	this	strategy	preserves	a	valuable	collective	good,	namely	a	set	of	
terms	with	clear,	unambiguous	meanings	that	are	already	understood	by	the	vast	majority	of	
commercial	parties	(Goetz	&	Scott	1985).	It	is	tempting	to	argue,	as	the	British	lawyers	did	
following	the	New	York	courts’	interpretations	of	pari	passu	in	NML	v.	Argentina,	that	such	a	
strict	construction	might	subvert	the	parties’	true	intentions	(Choi,	Gulati	&	Scott	2016a).		
However,	the	ability	of	commercial	actors	to	select	language	unencumbered	by	predefined	
meaning	offers	the	conventional	justification	for	the	rule.	
	
But	the	preceding	exposes	a	fundamental	dilemma	that	textualist	courts	confront	when	
applying	the	plain	meaning	presumption	to	linguistically	uncertain	boilerplate	such	as	the	pari	
passu	clause:		the	interpreter	must	somehow	distinguish	between	meaningful	language	and	
																																																						
11	Merger	clauses	are	given	virtually	conclusive	effect	in	New	York.			See	Tempo	Shain	Corp.	v.	Bertek,	Inc.,	120	F.3d	
16,	21	(2d	Cir.	1997)	(“Ordinarily,	a	merger	clause	provision	indicates	that	the	subject	agreement	is	completely	
integrated,	and	parol	evidence	is	precluded	from	altering	or	interpreting	the	agreement.”);	Norman	Bobrow	&	Co.	
v.	Loft	Realty	Co.,	577	N.Y.S.2d	36,	36	(App.	Div.	1991)	(“Parol	evidence	is	not	admissible	to	vary	the	terms	of	a	
written	contract	containing	a	merger	clause.”).	
	
12	The	New	York	courts’	plain	meaning	rule	addresses	the	question	of	what	legal	meaning	should	be	attributed	to	
the	contract	terms	that	the	parol	evidence	rule	has	identified:	when	words	or	phrases	appear	to	be	unambiguous,	
extrinsic	evidence	of	a	possible	contrary	meaning	is	inadmissible.		For	discussion,	see	Schwartz	&	Scott	(2010).	
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empty	boilerplate.		This	suggests	that	textualist	courts	are	well	advised	to	interpose	a	further	
step	before	applying	the	plain	meaning	presumption	when	interpreting	standardized	terms	in	
commercial	contracts.		The	court	should	first	admit	evidence	on	the	question	of	encrustation.	
The	evidence	we	have	described	above	is	illustrative	of	the	proof	that	the	parties	alleging	
encrustation	might	proffer.		Has	the	clause	been	repeated	by	rote	over	many	years,	where	
repetition	has	robbed	the	term	of	any	obvious	conventional	meaning?		Has	the	term	been	
embedded	in	layers	of	legal	jargon	such	that	its	intelligibility	is	substantially	reduced?13			Is	an	
historic	or	original	meaning	of	the	term	accessible	in	a	fashion	that	makes	sense	in	the	
contemporary	context	and	are	contemporary	commercial	actors	aware	of	that	meaning?14		Is	
there	credible	evidence	that	the	particular	provision	was	priced	at	the	original	issue	stage?15	
	
If	a	textualist	court	finds	evidence	of	encrustation	in	standard	boilerplate,	the	
presumption	of	shared	meaning	is	no	longer	apt.		Rather,	the	court	might	approach	a	resolution	
of	the	dispute	by	shifting	to	a	presumption	that	the	parties	have	attached	different	meanings	to	
the	term	in	question.		That	presumption	invokes	the	common	law	rule	that	if	parties	have	
																																																						
13	A	critic	might	ask	whether	what	we	call	“layers	of	legal	jargon”	or	“encrustation”,	is	being	unfairly	dismissed	as	
meaningless.		After	all,	these	encrustations	(like	the	insertion	of	the	word	“payment”	into	the	pari	passu	clause	
sometime	in	the	1970s)	were	knowingly	chosen	by	some	junior	lawyer	so	as	(probably)	to	make	the	clause	clearer	
or	more	advantageous	for	his	client.		If	it	was	consciously	chosen	by	a	lawyer,	the	critic	might	say,	surely	it	is	the	
opposite	of	meaningless	jargon.		Our	response	is	that	the	key	here	is	whether	the	underlying	core	clause	has	a	
meaning	that	both	parties	understand.		If	not,	then	adding	some	clarifying	language	to	what	is	gibberish	at	the	
core	either	leaves	us	with	gibberish	or	produces	a	new	clause	that	neither	party	understood	they	were	contracting	
for	(or	at	the	least,	only	one	party’s	junior	lawyer	understood).	
	
14	When	we	began	the	pari	passu	project	over	a	decade	ago,	one	of	the	initial	ideas	that	two	of	us	had	about	
solving	the	problem	of	the	market	unwillingness	to	fix	their	clauses	was	that	perhaps	all	it	would	take	was	an	
unearthing	of	the	original	meaning	(and	form)	of	the	clause.		Once	someone	did	that	and	credibly	showed	all	of	the	
parties	involved	what	the	clause	had	originally	meant	to	say,	then	they	could	decide	on	how	to	revise	it.		Choi	&	
Gulat	(2006).		So,	a	number	of	scholars,	including	us,	embarked	on	a	search	for	the	original	meaning	of	the	pari	
passu	clause	(the	first	versions	of	the	clause,	we	discovered,	were	used	in	the	early	1800s)	(Scott	&	Gulati	2013,	
Chabot	&	Gulati	2014,	Gelpern	2016).		To	our	chagrin,	however,	it	turned	out	that	the	contemporary	contract	
drafters	didn’t	care	one	bit	about	the	clause’s	original	meanings	–	the	context	of	the	1800s,	we	were	told	by	some	
respondents,	was	simply	too	different	to	care	about	what	the	original	conception	was	in	determining	what	to	do	
with	the	clause	today.	
	
15	Based	on	what	we	have	seen,	it	probably	does	not	mean	much	if	we	do	not	find	a	pricing	effect.	But	if	we	do	find	
an	effect,	it	likely	means	that	the	clause	was	intended	to	have	a	specific	discernable	meaning.	
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attached	different	meanings	to	a	term	neither	party	is	bound	by	the	meaning	of	the	other	
unless	at	the	time	of	contracting	one	party	did	not	know	(or	have	reason	to	know)	the	meaning	
of	the	counter	party,	who	in	turn	did	know	(or	have	reason	to	know)	the	meaning	of	the	first	
party.16		Applying	this	principle	to	the	NML	case,	and	assuming	neither	party	knew	or	had	
reason	to	know	of	the	other’s	different	ex	ante	understanding,	the	court	should	find	that	
neither	party’s	interpretation	of	pari	passu	was	legally	relevant.	Alternatively,	if	the	court	were	
to	find	that	NML/Elliot	knew	or	had	reason	to	know	of	Argentina’s	ex	ante	understanding	that	
pari	passu	did	not	encompass	the	ratable	interpretation,	the	court	would	be	directed	by	the	
rule	to	adopt	the	meaning	asserted	by	Argentina.	
	
*		*		*	
	
	 A	natural	question	for	a	skeptic	is	to	ask	whether	the	pari	passu	clause	is	idiosyncratic.		
Perhaps	the	pari	passu	clause	is	a	unique	example	of	encrustation.		Perhaps	there	are	few,	if	
any,	other	instances	of	standardized	boilerplate	that	no	one	understands,	but	that	nevertheless	
persist.	We	have	not	done	a	systematic	examination	of	all	of	the	contract	provisions	in	standard	
sovereign	bond	to	examine	which	of	them	have	become	rote	and	encrusted	and	which	ones	are	
clean—the	skill	and	ability	to	do	that	lies	with	the	contract	arbitrageurs.	
	
The	foregoing	caveat	aside,	even	we—as	outsiders	looking	at	this	industry—can	readily	
observe	other	contractual	black	holes,	including	number	of	examples	found	in	the	basic	check	
list	for	sovereign	bond	offerings.		The	obvious	one	for	us	is	the	Negative	Pledge	clause	that,	like	
the	pari	passu	clause,	has	a	vintage	that	goes	back	to	the	early	1800s.		The	basic	idea	underlying	
the	negative	pledge	clause	is	that	the	sovereign	promises	contracting	creditors	not	to	pledge	its	
assets	to	make	payments	to	other	creditors	(basically,	giving	the	other	creditors	a	preference)	
unless	it	also	ratably	or	equally	pledges	its	assets	to	the	contracting	creditors.		The	clause	
probably	made	sense	in	the	1800s	when	sovereign	borrowers	regularly	pledged	assets	to	
																																																						
16	See	Restatement	(Second)	Contracts	§	201(3).	In	the	case	where	one	party	does	not	know	the	meaning	of	the	
other	and	the	other	does	know	or	have	reason	to	know	the	meaning	of	the	first	party,	the	term	is	interpreted	in	
accordance	with	the	meaning	asserted	by	the	first	party.	See	Restatement	(Second)	§	201(2).	
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foreign	creditors	and	those	foreign	creditors	periodically	sent	troops	to	seize	assets	(mines,	
customs	houses,	railroads	and	so	on)	when	they	were	not	paid	(E.g.,	Krasner	2001).		But	
gunboat	diplomacy	is	no	longer	considered	civilized	and	international	law	does	not	allow	one	
nation	to	use	military	force	on	behalf	of	its	nationals	who	wish	to	seize	another	sovereign’s	
assets.	The	end	result	is	that	no	sovereigns	pledge	assets	these	days.		But	if	they	did	pledge	in	
violation	of	the	clause,	and	then	subsequently	defaulted,	it	is	not	at	all	clear	how	the	promise	of	
ratable	security	would	be	implemented,	what	legal	body	would	enforce	the	promise,	or	what	
that	would	mean	for	payments	to	the	creditors	with	and	without	the	clauses.		Yet,	despite	the	
fact	that	no	sovereigns	pledge	assets	these	days	and	almost	no	one	seems	to	know	how	the	
negative	pledge	clause	would	operate	vis-à-vis	a	sovereign	that	did	decide	to	pledge	assets	to	
some	and	not	others	in	violation	of	the	clause,	the	clause	persists.		Indeed,	like	the	pari	passu	
clause,	it	is	ubiquitous—it	is	on	the	“check	list”	and	therefore	an	integral	part	of	the	standard	
form,	even	though	no	one	seems	to	have	any	idea	why	it	is	there.		That,	we	would	say,	based	
on	watching	the	pari	passu	debacle,	is	fertile	ground	for	a	contract	arbitrageur.	
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